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“Religious Freedom,” The Individual Mandate, and Gifts: 
On Why the Church Is Not a Bomb Shelter 
 
 
 
Patrick McKinley Brennan1 
 
 
 
 
I. 
 
 In 2007, I published a paper bearing the formidable title, “The Decreasing 
Ontological Density of the State in Catholic Social Doctrine.”2  In more modest terms, 
the thesis of that mostly descriptive paper was that, over the course of the last 
century and the beginning of this one, much thinking in a Catholic idiom has 
downgraded the state.  Many welcomed the possibility of such a downgrading, while 
others considered it ominous.  I was on the fence, though inclined in the latter 
                                                        
1   John F. Scarpa Chair in Catholic Legal Studies and Professor of Law, Villanova 
University School of Law.  An early version of this paper was presented at the 
Roman Forum in Gardone Riviera, Italy, in July 2012, and I am grateful for its warm 
reception there and especially for the questions and suggestions of John Rao, Brian 
McCall, Chris Ferrara, and Monsignor Barreira.  This revised version of the paper 
was delivered at the Seventh Annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and 
Culture at Villanova Law School, on September 14, 2012, and will be published in 
the Villanova Law Review. 
2   Patrick McKinley Brennan, “The Decreasing Ontological Density of the State in 
Catholic Social Doctrine,” 52 Vill. L. Rev. 253 (2007).  An early version of the paper 
was presented at the First Annual John F. Scarpa Conference on Law, Politics, and 
Culture, at which the late Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., gave the keynote address and 
defended the thesis that the Church now teaches that the state is an instrument of 
civil society.  Avery Cardinal Dulles, S.J., “The Indirect Mission of the Church to 
Political Society,” 52 Vill. L. Rev. 241 (2007). 
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direction.  Further reflection and study have confirmed me in the judgment that the 
downgraded state, a merely “instrumentalist” state (as it is sometimes called, 
without a trace of the pejorative) is untenable, for both natural and supernatural 
reasons. 
Some background and context will help to set the stage for the current 
inquiry.  The eminent twelfth-century English jurist John of Salibury developed the 
image of the “body politic” to describe, in an unprecedented way, the relationship 
between civil society, the state, on the one hand, and ecclesiastical society, the 
Church, on the other.  This image structured most Catholic thought on the topic of 
“Church and state” until recently.  According to traditional Catholic thought, the 
state is nothing less (or other) than the body politic of which the Church is the soul, 
which together constitute a single unity of order.3  My earlier paper, echoing in part 
work by Russell Hittinger, undertook to demonstrate that recent Catholic thinking, 
including that of some of the more recent Popes, has sought to shrink the substance, 
scope, and end of the state, or, in a word, to de-substantiate the state.4  I meant to 
                                                        
3   See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal 
Tradition 286-92 (1983).  Jacques Maritain is among the most prominent Catholic 
dismantlers of this model.  See Jacques Maritain, Man and the State 9-19.  When I 
wrote “The Decreasing Ontological Density” paper, I was still heavily influenced by 
Maritain’s thought on this cluster of ideas. 
4   My title was a variation on part of a sentence by Russell Hittinger:  “In twentieth-
century Catholic thought, one detects a steady deterioration of any ontological 
density to the state.”  Russell Hittinger, “Introduction to Modern Catholicism,” in 
John Witte, Jr., and Frank Alexander (eds.), I The Teachings of Modern Christianity on 
Law, Politics, & Human Nature 3, 22 (2006).    As Hittinger explains (approvingly), 
“On the part of states, the solution would require jettisoning the idea that the 
modern state is a sanctum in the medieval sense of the term; it also point to the need 
for what the famous Catholic social theorist and politician Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959) 
termed a “rhythm of social duality.”  Society is neither a creature of the state nor the 
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sound something of a warning.  To separate the soul from the body is, after all, the 
very definition of death.   Which is why Blessed Pope Pius IX condemned so 
strenuously the proposition that “the Church ought to be separated from the State, 
and the State from the Church.”5 
In light of the foregoing, the issue I would like to pursue here, more than 
suggestively as I did in that earlier paper, is whether the downgraded state – the 
ontologically emaciated state -- of recent coinage can bear the weighty office 
assigned to the state by permanently valid tenets of Catholic doctrine.6  The Catholic 
tradition of reflection on the state is not static, but it does include elements and 
permanently valid ideals that are not subject to revision, even if their application 
will vary by time and place.  One of these is that the state is responsible, first, for the 
temporal common good, not merely for keeping the peace and preventing rampant 
violation of the harm principle, and, second, for collateral assistance to the Church in 
her distinct, superior, and ultimate mission of saving souls. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
church.  It is not a ‘depersonalized whole’ capacitated to act only through the 
superstructure of ecclesiastical or civil administration.”  Id. at 12. 
5   Syllabus of Errors No. 55 (1864). 
6 “These principles [regarding Church and state] are firm and immovable.  They 
were valid in the times of Innocent III and Boniface VIII.  They are valid in the days 
of Leo XIII and of Pius XII, who has reaffirmed them in more than one of his 
documents. . . .  I am certain that no one can prove that there has been any kind of 
change, in the matter of these principles, between Summi pontificatus of Pius XII and 
the encyclicals of Piux XI, Divini Redemptoris against Communism, Mit brennender 
Sorge against Nazism, and Non abbiamo bisogno against the state monopoly of 
facism, on the one hand; and the earlier encyclicals of Leo XIII, Immortale Dei, 
Libertas, and Sapientiae christianiae, on the other.  ‘The ultimate, profound, lapidary 
fundamental norms of society,’ says the august Pontiff [Pius XII] in his Christmas 
radio-message of 1942, ‘cannot be damaged by the intervention of man’s genius.  
Men can deny them, ignore them, despise them, disobey them, but they can never 
abrogate them with juridical efficacy.’”  Alfredo Cardinal Ottaviani, “Church and 
State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the Teachings of Pope Pius XII,” 128 
American Ecclesiastical Review, 321, 328-29 (1950). 
 4 
My question is what the Catholic tradition teaches about how we ought to 
think about the state, and the contemporary fact of the so-called contraceptive 
mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act makes this an opportune 
time to recall and recover aspects of the permanently valid ideal taught by the 
Church.  I will argue that it is not enough for the Church to be exempted from this 
law, so as to preserve her internal freedom; the Church’s mission includes 
correcting and transforming the state and civil society for the common good, not 
just staying at liberty within herself.  The latter is necessary but not sufficient. 
 
II 
I should pause here to anticipate the response of some people who would 
look exclusively to political philosophy or to whatever else, but certainly not to 
Church doctrine, to learn what the nature of the state is, if they even believe that the 
state has a “nature” anymore.  The Church and faithful Catholics must resist the 
fallacy behind this diversion away from doctrine, however, and for reasons that go 
to the heart of the matter.  For the last two thousand years, before any particular 
state comes into existence, the Church is already founded, and from the time of her 
founding, the Church has provided, among other things, a limit to the state.  Because 
of the Church, the state cannot be all in all.  As Pierre Manent has written, “the 
political development of Europe” – but not just of Europe – “ is understandable only 
as the history of answers to problems posed by the Church.”7  To a world that once 
contained only one perfect society, the state, another perfect society, the Church, 
                                                        
7   Pierre Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism 4 (1994). 
 5 
was added for the rest of time, and “the gates of hell shall not prevail against her” 
(Matt. 16:18).   Without reference to the Church’s self-understanding and correlative 
understanding of what is not the Church, the state cannot but risk usurping what is 
not its own and pursuing ends that are ultra vires.  Needless to say, states have not 
generally leapt to embrace the other perfect society in her wholeness, viewing her 
instead as the “problem” Manent reported.  And so the Church has worked out 
countless different relations with countless different states, some of them better for 
the Church’s mission than others.  Concordats constitute one category of mutual 
accommodation that the Church has often pursued. 
None of this is to say that the magisterium of the Church cannot err as it 
attempts prudently to determine how best to apply unchangeable elements of 
tradition in concrete historical circumstances.  It is to say, however, that the nature 
of the state cannot now be accurately established without attention to the Church 
and what she says about who she is and, correlatively, about what everything else, 
including the state, can or cannot be.  Before the inruption of the Church into 
salvation history, Greek and Roman philosophers (and others) were free, indeed 
obliged, to speculate about the nature of the state without regard to what did not yet 
exist.  After the founding of the Church at Pentecost, however, the nature of the state 
is radically altered, though you would hardly know as much from the decreasing 
ontological density of the state in some recent Catholic social thought.  And this, 
inevitably, is the context in which we consider the problem of the state today. 
The crux of the matter is the following:  “If we ask a modern person who or 
what is sovereign, he or she would not say ‘reason,’ ‘the individual,’ or ‘science,’” let 
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alone God, “but instead, without hesitation, ‘the state.’”8  The modern mind says this 
not about the corpus mysticum that was the organic union of the Catholic Church and 
the Catholic state, not about the absolute regimes that followed historically, but, 
ironically, about the modern nation state that has given up all pretense to rule in the 
name of a higher power in order, instead, relentlessly to expand its jurisdiction so as 
to achieve its new and substitute end of being an almost infinitely pliable conduit for 
the self-assertion of endlessly revisable selves.  The dangerous irony to be 
confronted here is that what some magisterial documents celebrate as a mere 
instrumentalist state – what Pope Pius XII in Summi Pontificatus referred to as 
“quasi instrumentum”9 -- ought instead to be feared.  Why?  Because the instrument 
has morphed from being the servant of the common good, of the bonum honestum as 
the ancients called it, into being the roving and armed agent of inexorable majority 
will.  Paradoxically, the ontologically emaciated, de-substantiated, instrumentalist 
state is not weak; it is awesomely powerful, indeed as is commonly said “sovereign,” 
in virtue of its not being inconvenienced or embarrassed by the restraints of higher 
law or, except by contingent concession, of other unities of order, let alone by that 
other and superior perfect society that is the Church.   
What the world needs is to recover the ontologically dense state, and for this 
what is needed is a recovery of the deeper strands of Catholic social doctrine, 
specifically those concerning the state’s place within an order of higher law, and 
those concerning the rightful place of the Church over and within the state and of a 
plurality of social forms that deserve not only immunity from state power but 
                                                        
8   Hittinger, “Introduction to Modern Catholicism,” 3, 4. 
9   Ven. Pope Pius XII, encyclical Summi Pontificatus No. 59 (1939). 
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freedom to fulfill what I shall refer to (following Pope Pius XI and later Catholic 
social doctrine) as their munera, their proper functions.  All of this is, as Henri De 
Lubac (whom Pope Paul VI wished to create a Cardinal and whom Blessed Pope 
John Paul II did create a Cardinal, in each instance for his theological work), “no 
more than the Gospel requires.”10  It is a separate project to construct states in 
defiance of the Gospel.     
 
III. 
 
 Lawyers like to work with examples, and here we can do no better than to 
consider the timely matter of the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act 
recently upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States.  By way of background, 
recall that President Barack Obama signed the Act into law in March of 2010.  The 
Act requires, among other things, that most employers’ group health plans cover 
women’s “preventive care.”  Congress did not define this term, and so it fell to the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to decide which “preventive 
services” to include in the mandate.  A year after the statute was enacted, the HHS 
announced that “preventive services” include contraceptives, abortifacients, and 
sterilization.  HHS also announced that some “religious employers” would be exempt 
from the requirement. According to the HHS, the exemption covers only those 
entities whose purpose is “the inculcation of religious values” and that hire and 
serve primarily people of the same religious faith. A parish or a seminary could meet 
                                                        
10   Henri De Lubac, The Splendor of the Church 194-95 (1986). 
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this definition, but most religious charities, schools, and hospitals would not.  
Needless to say, the distinction between “religion,” which is exempt, and corporate 
works of charity undertaken by the Church, which are not exempt, does not reflect 
the Catholic understanding of what it is to be Church in the world, but that is to get 
ahead of the story. 
In recently upholding the Act against numerous constitutional challenges, the 
Supreme Court did not answer, indeed it specifically reserved, the question of 
whether the individual mandate as construed by HHS would survive a challenge 
under the Free Exercise Clause of the U. S. Constitution.11  Such a challenge has 
already been lodged.  On May 20, 2012, forty-three religious institutions filed law 
suits in federal courts across the United States, and many others have followed. The 
terms of many of these legal challenges track the rationale of the challenge pressed 
for months in the media, led by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB), among others, according to which such a requirement violates the 
“religious liberty” of the Church by forcing her, as a condition of doing the charitable 
work of God’s Church, to violate the moral law as taught by the Church. 
The likely results of the lawsuits are hard to predict, above all for the reason 
that the U.S. Constitution has never been construed to protect the libertas Ecclesiae, 
                                                        
11
  “Other provisions of the Constitution also check congressional overreaching. A 
mandate to purchase a particular product would be unconstitutional if, for example, 
the edict impermissibly abridged the freedom of speech, interfered with the free 
exercise of religion, or infringed on a liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause.”  National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, __ U.S. __ (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting) (slip op., at 29). 
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strictly speaking, or even of the liberty of churches, generically speaking.12  It is true, 
nonetheless, that there are precedents that, taken together, could provide the Court 
some basis for finding in favor of the Church.  I will mention just two examples.  In 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, decided in 2000, the Court upheld, in 5-4 vote, the 
right of the Boy Scouts not to have to accept homosexual Scout masters on the 
ground that to do so would violate the Scouts’ constitutionally protected freedom of 
expressive association based in the First Amendment guarantee of free speech.  In a 
second and related vein, in January 2012, in Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church and 
School v. EEOC, the Court held unanimously that the Establishment and Free 
Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment require the availability of an “affirmative 
defense” against suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, 
claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws.13  These and 
                                                        
12   “Notwithstanding all of the date points in the paragraph, it remains unclear and 
unsettled what exactly are the content and textual home in the Constitution for the 
church-autonomy principle, -- or even, indeed, if there is such a principle.  It does 
not seem unfair to suggest that the doctrine has something of an emanations-and-
penumbras air about it.”  Richard Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church,” 4 Journal of 
Catholic Social Thought, 59, 76 (2007). 
13  “We conclude that the exception operates as an affirmative defense to an 
otherwise cognizable claim, not a jurisdictional bar. That is because the issue 
presented by the exception is “whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle 
him to relief,” not whether the court has “power to hear [the] case.” Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) (slip op., at 4–5) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).” Hosana-Tabor Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC 565 
U.S. __ n.4 (2012).  The significance of the constitutional limit’s being an “affirmative 
defense” rather than a jurisdictional bar is huge, as Mark Strasser has seen, though 
from what I regard as the wrong point of view.  See Mark Strasser, “On Making the 
Anomalous More Anomalous,” available at Bepress.  Cf. Greg Kalscheur, “Civil 
Procedure and the Establishment Clause: Exploring the Ministerial Exception, 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, and the Freedom of the Church,” 17 William and Mary 
Bill of Rights Journal, 43 (2008) (defending a subject-matter jurisdictional position).  
See also Michael Helfand, “Religion’s Footnote Four: Church Autonomy as 
Arbitration,”  (unpublished draft, September 2012). 
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some other holdings present some filaments that could perhaps be woven together 
into an argument that Church agencies have a right to be let alone.  And this is 
exactly the point to underscore: these are arguments for groups to be let alone.  
The cultural and societal push in favor of such argument, to the limited 
extent there is such a push, sounds in terms of “pluralism,” that is, the desirability of 
a plurality of groups.  But why, we might well ask, should such arguments prevail?  
Why is more better in this context?  Or, more technically, why is such pluralism 
normative?  Sometimes the answer is just assumed or assumed away, as a sort of a 
fortiori from the presumed hegemony of “diversity.”  A more common but still crude 
account teaches that civil society is stabilized by power checking power, and this is 
an account with a familiar if dubious intellectual pedigree and aim.14  A third 
account, which lends some indirect support to the predicates – though not 
necessarily the aims -- of the second, is that groups or, to speak more technically, 
associations, have an irreducible ontological reality that calls for acknowledgment, 
at least by realists.   
To this third view the great nineteenth-century English jurist F.W. Maitland 
gave memorable voice: 
 
When a body of twenty, or two thousand, or two hundred thousand men bind 
themselves together to act in a particular way for some common purpose, 
they create a body, which by no fiction of law, but by the very nature of 
things, differs from the individuals of whom it is constituted. . . .  If the law 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
14   Manent, An Intellectual History of Liberalism, 53-64. 
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allows men to form permanently organized groups, those groups will be for 
common opinion right-and-duty bearing units; and if the law-giver will not 
openly treat them as such, he will misrepresent, or, as the French say, he will 
“denature” the facts . . . .  For the morality of common sense the group is a 
person, is right-and-duty bearing unity.15   
 
On this account, when individuals, with the intention of stable order, engage in 
united action for a common purpose, the result is a new existent, a unity that 
transcends the aggregation of its parts.  In other words, a group person or what St. 
Thomas refers to as a unity of order comes into existence.16   When this happens, 
Maitland notes, we are required to recognize “n + 1 persons.”  To do otherwise 
would be, again, to “de-nature the facts.”  It is conceded that groups are not 
ontologically basic in the order of substances or substantial unities.  “They are basic, 
however, in constituting a unity that excels parts (members) which are also wholes 
(natural persons).”17  As a bearer of rights and responsibilities, an association, like a 
substantial unity, “can harm or be harmed in the moral sense of the term.”18  
 In its strongest form, then, pluralism of the sort I just have been summarizing 
is a plea not to de-nature the facts.  Those who grant the facts, however, can counter 
                                                        
15   David Runciman (ed.), Maitland: State, Trust and Church 63, 68 (2003).  See also 
David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State 89-123 (1997). 
16 Russell Hittinger, “The Coherence of the Four Basic Principles of Catholic Social 
Doctrine: An Interpretation,” Keynote Address, Pontifical Academy of the Social 
Sciences, XVIII Plenary Session (Citta Del Vaticano) 2 May 2008, 87 n.24. 
17 Hittinger, “The Coherence,” 87.  See also Patrick McKinley Brennan, “Harmonizing 
Plural Societies: The Case of Lasallians, Families, Schools – and the Poor,” 45 Journal 
of Catholic Legal Studies 131, 151-54 (2006). 
18   Hittinger, “The Coherence,” 88. 
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that the state may have good and sufficient reason to require through law that 
associations conform to the extrinsic norms of positive law.  The point is concessum 
as concerns a spectrum of associations but not, however, with respect to the Church, 
which is not, in the relevant sense, just an “association.”  When it comes to the 
Church, she has a divine right to exercise a direct jurisdiction with which the state 
may not interfere, at least not without the Church’s concession.  To insist on this 
point is to risk being murdered in a cathedral, however, as T.S. Eliot recalled in 1935 
writing of the consequences “the absence of a cathartic moment of a repentant 
state.”19  So, for reasons of safety, I merely mention it and move on.  
Returning to my main line of argument, we need to augment the analysis by 
introducing the technical term “civil society,” a protean but prodigious contributor 
to contemporary debate about the limits of government.  In his book Conditions of 
Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals, political philosopher Ernest Gellner refers to the 
“miracle of Civil Society,” which he defines as   
 
that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to 
counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its 
                                                        
19   Hittinger, “Introduction to Modern Catholicism,” 17.  As the late Harold Berman 
wrote, “[t]he conflict between Becket and Henry was essentially a conflict over the 
scope of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; it was thus a paradigm of the Papal Revolution, 
which established throughout the West two types of competing political-legal 
authority, the spiritual and the secular.  One effect of this dualism was to enchance 
the political-legal authority of kings in the secular sphere.  Another effect was to 
create tensions at the boundaries of royal and papal jurisdictions.  These tensions 
were resolved in different ways in different kingdoms.  Their resolution in England 
was strongly influenced by circumstances of Becket’s martyrdom.”  Berman, Law 
and Revolution, 260. 
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role of keeper of the peace and arbitrator between major interests, can 
nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomizing the rest of society.20  
   
I will mention two problems with Gellner’s instrumentalist account of civil society.  
First, it would seem to allow defense of civil society principally on the ground that 
“useful goods, including liberty, are more efficiently produced and distributed by 
non-governmental agents.”  Indeed, according to Gellner, civil society is the “social 
residue left when the state is subtracted.”21  The trouble with this defense of the 
non-state association is that it reduces the private sector to exactly -- neither more 
nor less than -- what it can do most efficiently and to what mutually checking 
powers are needed to check the power of the state.  Harvard political scientist 
Nancy Rosenblum supplements this generic efficiency defense of civil society with 
the specific efficiency that a pluralism of private associations lets off the steam of 
values that are illiberal and therefore inconsistent with the ideals of liberal 
democracy.22   
 The second and related problem with a purely instrumentalist defense of 
civil society, also from a functionalist perspective, is that it provides no traction to 
resist government efforts on behalf of what Rosenblum and Yale Law dean Robert 
Post refer to disarmingly as “congruence.”  They explain that:    
 
                                                        
20  Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: The 
Penguin Press, 1994), 32. 
21   Gellner, Conditions of Liberty, 212. 
22   See Hittinger, First Grace, 269. 
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[t]he “logic of congruence” envisions civil society as reflecting common 
values and practices “all the way down.”  Congruence is often advocated with 
regard to the egalitarian norms of liberal democracy.  The claim is that the 
internal lives of associations should mirror public norms of equality, 
nondiscrimination, due process, and so on.  In the United States, for example, 
norms of equality have been imposed on vast areas of social life, even on 
small, informal associations.23 
 
Rosenblum and Post were writing a decade ago, but note how perfectly the Obama 
Administration’s arguments for equal access to “preventive services” exemplify an 
application of the logic of congruence, one to which Gellner’s social residue provides 
no resistance.  Rosenblum and Post perhaps counseled something of a cautious 
modus vivendi between the aspirations of congruence and the particularist pluralism 
of civil society24, but the unavailing quality of such articles of peace is now 
unmistakable.  The downgraded state that is ontologically thin becomes the 
powerful, imposing agent of the preferences of the majority.  As Rosenblum and Post 
explain: 
 
Advocates of congruence fear that the multiplication of intermediate 
institutions does not mediate but balkanizes public life. They are 
apprehensive that plural associations and groups amplify self-interest, 
                                                        
23   Nancy L. Rosenblum and Robert C. Post, “Introduction,” Nancy L. Rosenblum and 
Robert C. Post (eds.), Civil Society and Government  1, 13 (2002). 
24 Rosenblum and Post, “Introduction,” 17. 
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encourage arrant interest-group politics, exaggerate cultural egocentrism, 
and defy government. What is needed, in their view, is a strong assertion of 
public values and policies designed to loosen the hold of particular 
affiliations, so that members will be empowered to look beyond their groups 
and to identify themselves as members of the larger political community. The 
“logic of congruence” envisions civil society as reflecting common values and 
practices “all the way down.”25 
 
The ontologically thin state Rosenblum and Post defend turns out to be as 
potentially powerful as one can imagine, even as it masquerades under the 
unassuming mask of “congruence.”   
 
 
IV 
 
 It is fair to say that since the mid-nineteenth century, liberalism and Catholic 
social doctrine have been alike in their attentiveness to limits on the state.  But 
whereas liberals valued civil society mainly for its instrumental – and, as we have 
seen, mostly illusory -- ability to check the state, Catholic social doctrine has 
recognized and sought to multiply the intrinsic perfections of societies or 
associations. What “social residue” defenses of civil society, such as Gellner’s, 
systematically ignore (and implicitly deny) is the intrinsic value of such social forms 
                                                        
25 Rosenblum and Post, “Introduction,” 13. 
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as the family and the Church, including the manifold manifestations of the Church in 
schools, colleges, convents, monasteries, hospitals, and so forth.  What they also 
ignore or wish to deny, therefore, is that such unities of order are bearers of 
irreducible authority.  “Residue” is no repository of genuine authority, but valid 
associations are.26 
 The Catholic view comes into focus if we attend to the notion of the munus 
regale – that is, the particular function, mission, gift, or vocation that is ruling.  
Beginning with the pontificate of Pius XI, this notion of the munus regale in which 
humans participate – and it is a “participation,” for there is only one true King -- has 
been applied beyond its earlier Christological and ecclesiological boundaries to the 
offices, rights, and duties of social institutions.  Properly understood, the notion of 
munus regale preserves but corrects the liberal’s doctrine of social pluralism.27 
 The Latin word munus is best, if imperfectly, translated into English as 
“function.”  What is lost in the translation that must be preserved is that the word 
connotes gift-giving.  This is reflected in the English word munificent, from the Latin 
munificus, meaning generous or bountiful.  The word community, communitas, 
derives from the sharing of gifts.  The Magi gave munera to the Christ child.  And 
Christians speak of the triplex munus Christi: priest, prophet, and king.28  
 In the encyclical Divini Redemptoris, for example, Pope Pius XI wrote as 
follows: 
 
                                                        
26   See Hittinger, First Grace, 272. 
27   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 388-89, 393-94. 
28   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 389-90. 
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We have indicated how a sound prosperity is to be restored according to the 
true principles of a sane corporative system which respects the proper 
hierarchic structure of society; and how the occupational groups should be 
fused into a harmonious unity inspired by the principle of the common good.  
And the genuine and chief [munus] of public and civil authority consists 
precisely in the efficacious furthering of this harmony and coordination of all 
social forces.29 
 
Pope Pius XI’s immediate successor, Pope Pius XII, continued to develop and apply 
this ontology, as here in the encyclical Summi Pontificatus: 
 
It is the noble prerogative and [munus] of the [civitas] to control, aid, and 
direct the private and individual activities of national life that they converge 
harmoniously towards the common good.30 
 
 
The development and application of the munera has continued down to the present, 
and it is worth noting that Latin edition of the Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae uses 
the word munus at least 125 times, and the 1983 Code of Canon Law uses the term 
nearly 190 times.31  My present purpose, though, is not to chart the later 
development and application of the concept but to establish its meaning in the Pian 
                                                        
29   No. 31 
30   No. 59 
31   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 389. 
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encyclicals and to see what light it sheds on the current debate about the 
contraceptive mandate and what the Church has to say about it. 
We do not know exactly who or what moved Pius XI to apply the sacral 
concept of munera to the juridical realm.32  We do know that beginning with Leo 
XIII’s encyclical Annum Sacrum in 1899, the popes delved more and more deeply 
into Christ and His ruling powers, and Pius XI in a series of six encyclicals – 
beginning with Ubi Arcano and Quas Primas and finishing with Divini Redemptoris – 
articulated the analogies between Christ’s unique munus regale and the munera of 
baptized Christians.  Whereas in the Leonine period individuals and associations 
were said to bear iura et officia, with Pius XI they were frequently said to bear 
munera, which are in fact the source of the iura.33 
 The idea of munus beautifully conjoins the Aristotelian notion of an ergon or 
function (Nic. Ethics I.7) with the more biblical concept of vocation or mission.34  
With this Pius got at something that was occluded in the conventional Thomism of 
the time.  The key point is that at the time of Pius XI’s pontificate (1922-1939), the 
pressing question of social doctrine was not just whether man was a social animal 
naturally ordered to a common good in the state, but, more precisely, the status of 
societies and social roles other than the state.  It was these that the totalitarians 
stripped of their group personality.  Therefore, as Russell Hittinger explains, “It 
wasn’t enough just to repeat the standard formulae of commutative, distributive, 
                                                        
32   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 391.  This development occurred in the context of a 
renewed recovered of a richer ecclesiology.  See, e.g., Pope Pius XII, encyclical 
Mystici corporis (1943).  No. 61 of the encyclical especially reflects the ontology 
developed by Pius XI in terms of munera. 
33   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 391-92 n.15. 
34   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 392. 
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and legal justice.  Without social content, these formulae serve no useful purpose.  In 
fact, arguments to the common good can prove counter-productive in the face of the 
modern state, which is more than happy to make common the entire range of 
goods”35 -- or, more to the point, of false goods.  Think, for example, of the logic of 
“congruence” and equal access to “preventive services.”  But this is to get ahead of 
the story again.   
The point to emphasize first is that Pius wished to emphasize that rights are 
not derived from human nature considered in the abstact; instead, the right is 
settled and rights are then predicated on the basis of antecedent munera.  We are 
accustomed in law to consider rights as immunities -- im-munitas, etymologically, 
implies the absence of a munus.36  But this gets things backwards.  Pius XI’s 
achievement was to establish that an adequate account of the social order cannot 
proceed in the first place from immunities or negative rights.  We must begin with 
the munera that the immunities and rights in turn vindicate.  The civil ruling 
authority discovers -- he does not assign -- munera that are assigned by creation and 
redemption, that is, by the natural law and by the divine or ecclesiastical law, 
respectively.  Nor does the civil ruling authority assign a Catholic hospital its munus; 
this the Church does, and it is for the civil ruling authority to discover it. 
 Discovering is not all the civil ruling authority is to do, however.  It must also 
facilitate or, perhaps better, harmonize37 the plural societies in their achievement of 
                                                        
35   Hittinger, Social Pluralism,” 393. 
36 Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 393. 
37 I pursued a particular example of this work of “harmonizing” in Patrick McKinley 
Brennan, “Harmonizing Plural Societies,” supra.   For a general and helpfully 
technical treatment of the relationship between parts and wholes in a community as 
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their assigned munera, and to do so is exactly to achieve social justice, that 
misunderstood term that just means, as Pius XI teaches in Divini Redemptoris, that 
the common good is to be realized through munera-bearing associations and 
institutions.38  The munus of the Church is assigned by divine positive law, but most 
munera are assigned by the divine natural law.  With respect to the latter point, as 
St. Thomas argues in his opusculum Contra Impugnantes, free associations are 
valuable and to be respected – and their works harmonized -- because they make 
communication possible, by which Thomas means making something common, or, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
understood by Aquinas, see Michael Baur, “Law and Natural Law,” in Brian Davies 
and Eleonore Stump (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Aquinas 238, 238-44 (2012). 
38 “Verum enim vero, praeter iustitiam, quam commutativam vocant, socialis etiam 
iustitia colenda est, quae quidem ipsa officia postulat, quibus neque artifices neque 
heri se subducere possunt. Atqui socialis iustitiae est id omne ab singulis exigere, 
quod ad commune bonum necessarium sit. Ut autem, ad quamlibet viventis corporis 
compagem quod attinet, in universum consultum non est, nisi singulis membris ea 
omnia tribuantur, quibus eadem indigeant ad suas partes explendas; ita, ad 
communitatis constitutionem temperationemque quod pertinet, totius societatis 
bono prospici non potest, nisi singulis membris, hominibus videlicet personae 
dignitate ornatis, illud omne impertiatur, quod iisdem opus sit, ad sociale munus 
cuiusque suum exercendum. Si igitur iustitiae sociali provisum fuerit, ex oeconomicis 
rebus uberes enascentur actuosae navitatis fructus, qui in tranquillitatis ordine 
maturescent, Civitatisque vim firmitudinemque ostendent; quemadmodum humani 
corporis valetudo ex imperturbata, plena fructuosaque eius opera dignoscitur.”  
Divini Redemptoris No. 51 (1939).  Christian employers and industrialists have a 
proper munus: “Quapropter vos peculiari modo compellamus, christi ani heri 
officinarumque domini, quibus proprium est saepenumero tam difficile munus, 
quandoquidem illam errorum quasi hereditatem ab iniusto oeconomicarum rerum 
regimine excepistis, quod in tot hominum aetates ruinose influxit: officiorum 
memores estote, quibus respondere debetis.”  Divini Redemptoris No. 50.  Catholic 
working men also have a “munus” to make the Church known in their places of 
work: “Patris heic animo alloqui carissimos Nobis catholicos opifices, vel 
adolescente vel adulta aetate, libet, qui ob strenue servatam fidem in tanta 
temporum iniquitate, honestum arduumque onus et munus, loco praemii, accepisse 
videantur.  . . . .  Quod quidem munus, ad fodinas, ad officinas, ad armamentaria, 
quocumque denique opus initur, proferendum, cum incommoda quandoque 
postulet, meminerint catholici iidem operarii Christum Iesum cum operis exemplo, 
perpessionis quoque exemplum coniunxisse.”  Divini Redemptoris No. 70. 
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more precisely, one rational agent participating in the life of another and generating 
and sharing intelligibilities that would otherwise go unachieved.39  To quote 
Hittinger: 
 
[T]o prevent free men and women from associating for the purpose of 
communicating gifts is contrary to the natural law. It is tantamount to 
denying to rational agents the perfection proper to their nature, and denying 
the commonweal goods it would not enjoy were it not for free association 
 
-- and, I would add, the intrinsic perfections capable only within it.40 
And it is here that that other frequently misunderstood and abused principle 
of Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity, enters, for it is derived from social justice.  
Subsidiarity is the principle that when aid or subsidium be given either by the parts 
to the whole or by the whole to the parts, the “manifold organicity” of the common 
good is to be respected and aided, not destroyed or absorbed.41  Properly 
understood, subsidiarity is not (as is commonly thought) a principle of devolution or 
smallness of scale; rather, it is a principle of non-absorption predicated on the facts, 
established by creation or redemption, that groups have irreducible munera to fufill 
and gifts to give.  Subsidiarity cannot create a social ontology; subsidiarity 
presupposes the existence of social forms, each having its own esse proprium, its 
own munus to be done and given.  These munera are participations in the munus 
                                                        
39   Hittinger, First Grace, 271. 
40   Hittinger, First Grace, 272. 
41   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 393-96. 
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regale of Christ the King, which means that they are measured and ruled by the 
measure and rule of Christ’s rational will for the community and its common good. 
 In sum, then, civil society is not accurately conceived as an arbitrary 
“plurality” or, worse, an undifferentiated and tractionless “residue.” What we 
confront, instead, are individuals with their respective munera and associations 
with their respective munera, all of them arrayed under and within the state and the 
Church, as the case may be, sometimes in an overlapping jurisdiction, each of which 
individual or member association bearing its own respective munus to be performed 
or given.  The state’s munus is the temporal common good and, furthermore, 
collateral contribution to the achievement of the supernatural common good by, in 
part, harmonizing plural societies according to social justice and the derivative 
principle of subsidiarity.  And the Church’s munus is to accomplish the divine will 
that all be saved (I Tim. 2:4), in part by ensouling the state.   The result, then, is an 
ontologically dense state that is not vulnerable to arbitrary impositions by a willful 
civil society, because it is girded and powered from within, so to speak, by munera 
that must be discharged, by gifts that demand to be given, because they are 
participations in the munus of Christ, who rules from above. 
  
V. 
 
 As I signaled at the outset, the commonly heard “Catholic” objection to the 
HHS mandate for “preventive services” is that the mandate “violates religious 
liberty.”  Perhaps this is so, but I find the expression woefully vague and, to the 
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extent it can be clarified, under-inclusive, so to speak, of the Catholic social doctrine 
I have just summarized.   Here, for example, is the pivotal language in the USCCB’s 
much-discussed document, “Our First, Most Cherished Liberty:” 
 
The mandate of the Department of Health and Human Services has received 
wide attention and has been met with our vigorous and united opposition. In 
an unprecedented way, the federal government will both force religious 
institutions to facilitate and fund a product contrary to their own moral 
teaching and purport to define which religious institutions are "religious 
enough" to merit protection of their religious liberty. These features of the 
"preventive services" mandate amount to an unjust law. As Archbishop-
designate William Lori of Baltimore, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for 
Religious Liberty, testified to Congress: "This is not a matter of whether 
contraception may be prohibited by the government. This is not even a 
matter of whether contraception may be supported by the government. 
Instead, it is a matter of whether religious people and institutions may be 
forced by the government to provide coverage for contraception or 
sterilization, even if that violates their religious beliefs.42 
 
 I will begin with the last point.  The document claims that the problem with 
the mandate is that “we,” the Catholic Church, are being forced to do something that 
we Catholics regard as immoral, or, as Timothy Cardinal Dolan, the Archbishop of 
                                                        
42  United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, “Our First, Most Cherished Liberty: 
A Statement on Religious Liberty,” 2012.  (available on USCCB website). 
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New York and President of the USCCB, put the point elsewhere, something that 
violates “our standard of respecting religious liberty.”43  With all due respect, this is 
a remarkably self-referential position.   As Francis Cardinal George recently wrote, 
“Among the sayings of Jesus, there are about as many that start ‘Woe to you…’ as 
there are those that begin ‘Blessed are they…’”44, and Jesus did not limit their effects 
to “us.”  It is a diversion to frame the issue concerning the mandate as exclusively, or 
even principally, as about what the Church is being forced to do.  That’s only the 
start of it.  The problem with this law is not just that it forces us (“the Church”) to do 
what we regard as immoral; it is not just that it forces us and others to do what we 
and they regard as immoral.  The problem is also and above all that it forces us and 
others to do what is immoral, regardless of who does or does not consider it to me 
immoral.  It is not anyone’s disagreement with the required act that makes the 
required act objectionable; the final cause of the act itself is sufficient to make the 
act immoral.45  (The degree of individual culpability is, of course, another question  -
- and one that is perhaps affected by the Bishops’ own disavowals and bashfulness).   
The munera of both the Church and the state include the work of making the 
moral law effective in human living, yet in the face of the state’s acting in violation of 
the moral law, the Bishops overtly disowned -- in the language I quoted and will 
quote in part again -- their munus to exhort state and citizens to conform the 
positive law to the moral law:  “This is not even a matter of whether contraception 
may be supported by the government.”   I am afraid that the Bishops’ position boils 
                                                        
43  Dolan to Obama, February (emphasis added). 
44   Francis Cardinal George, O.M.I., “Chicago Values, Revisited: it’s not about 
chicken!”, Catholic Chicago Blog, August 6, 2012. 
45   Pope Paul VI, encyclical Humanae vitae (1968). 
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down to a plea to be let alone.  Cardinal Dolan is in accord: “That’s all it’s really 
about: religious freedom.  It’s not about access to contraception, as much as our 
local newspaper—surprise!—insists it is. The Church is hardly trying to impose its 
views on society, but rather resisting the government’s attempt to force its view on 
us.  That’s all it’s really about: religious freedom.  The Church is hardly trying to 
impose its views on society, but rather resisting the government’s attempt to force 
its view on us.”46  Cardinal Dolan continues: “Vast and unfettered access to chemical 
contraceptives and abortifacients—all easier to get, they tell me, than beer and 
cigarettes—will continue. If you think it’s still not enough, then subsidize them if 
you insist. Just don’t make us provide them and pay for them!”47  Needless to say, 
the Church cannot, as a practical matter, “impose” her views on society, so that’s a 
red herring. Surely, however, the Church can at least propose “her views,” especially 
through the episcopal munus, rather than just going inside and underground. 
Returning from the specific point to the general, here again is Cardinal 
Dolan’s overall approach in action: “We just want to be left alone to live out the 
imperatives of our faith to serve, teach, heal, feed, and care for others.”48  Cardinal 
Dolan’s rhetorical (and theological?) starting point is too cramped.  Self-
marginalization or abnegation, verging perhaps on self-imposed exile, is exactly 
what an ecclesial society with gifts to give cannot do.  If it is to be true to its munera, 
                                                        
46   “Freedom Is Worth Defending,” Catholic New York, May 31, 2012. 
47   “Freedom Is Worth Defending,” Catholic New York, May 31, 2012. 
 
48 Timothy Cardinal Dolan, “Religious Freedom and Protecting Healthcare for 
Women,” The Gospel in the Digital Age, Archdiocese of New York, posted March 16, 
2012. 
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it will seek to correct and transform the culture as God commands and wishes us -- 
qua Church – to do.  The Church’s claim is not to be “left alone:” it is to change the 
world, including through the good deeds mentioned by Cardinal Dolan.  At the risk of 
belaboring the obvious, the munus regale of the hierarchy is not confined to the 
sacristy and the munus regale of the laity is not confined to the home.  As to the 
munus of the laity, the Second Vatican Council is quite emphatic that the laity’s role 
is “to impress the divine law on the earthly city.”49  To impress is not to remain 
passive.  The Council also teaches that it does not fall to the laity “exclusively” to 
perform that work.50  Other than the laity are the clergy (including the hierarchy).  
There is no additional category of natural actors: the disjunction is exhaustive.  
(Religious, whether men or women, are not, as such, clergy).  This teaching of the 
Second Vatican Council, about impressing the divine law on the earthly city, is 
impossible to square with the following: “Just don’t make us provide them and pay 
for them!” (emphasis added).  The rest of the world can go to hell – just don’t 
contaminate “us”!51   
                                                        
49 Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Constitution on the Church in the Modern 
World, Gaudium et Spes No. 43 (1965).  See also Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 
Lumen Gentium No. 31 (1964). 
50 Gaudium et spes No. 43 (“Laicis proprie, etsi non exclusive, saecularia officia et 
navitates competent”). 
51  Some Catholic thinkers, including the Popes, before the mid-twentieth century 
saw this coming:  “they feared that once the state was depicted instrumental terms, 
the other organs of society would inevitably follow suit.  In other words, they feared 
that the liberal state, even in its most favorable depiction as an instrument rather 
than the substance of the common good, would produce atomism and 
instrumentalism in every other sector of society.”  Hittinger, First Grace, 267. 
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What the argument exclusively from “religious freedom” neglects – or, rather, 
often intentionally suppresses -- is the fact that the Church and her charities are 
entitled to freedom not just because of a brute right to be let alone, a right not to be 
interfered with, or, in other words, an immunity.  Rights to be let alone are 
derivative, as we have seen, of the various associations’ respective particular 
munera, the works and functions they are charged to perform.  The sufficient reason 
to let schools, adoption agencies, and all the rest, including hospitals, go about their 
work unhindered is that social justice and subsidiarity demand it.  They demand it 
because the Church has entrusted her munus of charity to these particular 
associations which are capable, as Pope Benedict XVI stressed in the encyclical Deus 
Caritas Est, echoing Leo XIII in the encyclical Rerum Novarum, of delivering what the 
state could never do or even simulate52, and all of that is no less than what Christ the 
King commands His Church to do.   The reason the state is legally obligated, not 
merely obliged, to respect the Church’s governance of her member organs, including 
hospitals, is that, by divine law, the Church enjoys a real, direct, and final jurisdiction 
over herself and her members.  But this does not mean that the Church is not also 
charged by divine law to correct and transform the world. 
Some defend the exclusivity of the “just let us alone” argument on prudential 
grounds.  I respect those who honestly defend such a position, despite its glaring 
incompleteness, and although I do indeed see some circumstance-specific (viz., late 
post-Modernity) merit to this line of argument, I am not persuaded, certainly not of 
its sufficiency.  Does it not bespeak a much deeper and unacceptable abdication and 
                                                        
52  Pope Benedict XVI, encyclical Deus Caritas Est Nos. 28b, 31 (2005); Pope Leo XIII, 
encyclical Rerum Novarum No. 30 (1891). 
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resignation, in the face of a deadly political morality, of the munus regale? 
Regardless of the prudence vel non of that argument, though, there is, I must 
concede, some fairly prestigious precedent for such a defense.  I refer to the Second 
Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatis humanae Par. 13, 
which states that the libertas Ecclesiae is “principium fundamentale” governing 
relations between the Church and government and the whole civil order.  The 
teaching of Diginitatis is not infallible as a matter of Catholic theology, however, and 
I am afraid that on this point, at least, it is mistaken.  As Marcel Lefebvre once 
explained: 
 
Freedom is not the fundamental principle, nor a fundamental principle in the 
matter.  The public law of the Church is founded on the State’s duty to 
recognize the social royalty of Our Lord Jesus Christ!  The fundamental 
principle which governs the relations between Church and State is the “He 
must reign” of St. Paul: Oportet illum regnare (I Cor. 15:25) – the reign that 
applies not only to the Church but must be foundation of the temporal city.53 
 
It is a permanently valid principle of Catholic social doctrine – because it is the one 
historical inevitability – that Christ must reign.  As the early Christians understood 
and taught, creation itself was for the sake of the Church54, and the munus of the 
Church is not merely the maintenance of some internal freedom for the benefit of 
the faithful already graced to be inside the bomb shelter; it is, as well, as it was in the 
                                                        
53 Michael Davies, 2 Apologia Pro Marcel Lefebvre 122 (1983). 
54   See Catechism of the Catholic Church Par. 760 (1999). 
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first place, to serve, among other functions, as the soul of the body politic, and thus 
to contribute to the achievement of the common goods, both natural and 
supernatural.   
  
 
VI 
 
 I will conclude by quoting the last paragraph of my “Decreasing Ontological 
Density” paper: 
 
One can affirm that the Church is sacred in a way that the state, properly 
understood, is not, without having to deny that the state is possessed of a 
share of sacred ruling authority.  If what authority for rule the state 
possesses is in no way sacred, however, then it can be no part of the divine 
ruling power.  Do we humans have a self-possessed power to rule, a rival to 
the divine [rule]?  If have we have not received a law, then on what basis do 
we proceed to make law?  In one of my favorite lines of all time, Justice 
Antonin Scalia opined that “God,” not man, “applies the natural law.”  If that 
be true, what, then, do we do?  Inasmuch as a devoutly Catholic Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States has consigned us to a fate without benefit 
of the natural law, the question is not merely speculative.55 
 
                                                        
55  Brennan, “Decreasing Ontological Density,” 279 (italics added). 
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The only adequate answer, I see more clearly than I did five years ago, is a proper 
cooperation between – not the separation of – Church and state.  The Church was 
not founded to repose in a gilded cage but, instead, to save men’s souls and, to that 
end, to correct and transform this fallen creation.  “Although the world knows it not, 
the most primordial law of ruling is service, which is always the signature of the 
divine.  Not sovereignty as the moderns understand it, but rather a gift 
communicated for the good of another.”56        
 
 
 
  
 
                                                        
56   Hittinger, “Social Pluralism,” 401. 
